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and Pascal Magnussen4
Abstract 
Background: Malaria is a major public health problem in Uganda and the current policy recommends introduction 
of rapid diagnostic tests for malaria (RDTs) to facilitate effective case management. However, provision of RDTs in drug 
shops potentially raises a new set of issues, such as adherence to RDTs results, management of severe illnesses, referral 
of patients, and relationship with caretakers. The main objective of the study was to examine the impact of introduc-
ing RDTs in registered drug shops in Uganda and document lessons and policy implications for future scale-up of 
malaria control in the private health sector.
Methods: A cluster-randomized trial introducing RDTs into registered drug shops was implemented in central 
Uganda from October 2010 to July 2012. An evaluation was undertaken to assess the impact and the processes 
involved with the introduction of RDTs into drug shops, the lessons learned and policy implications.
Results: Introducing RDTs into drug shops was feasible. To scale-up this intervention however, drug shop practices 
need to be regulated since the registration process was not clear, supervision was inadequate and record keeping 
was poor. Although initially it was anticipated that introducing a new practice of record keeping would be cumber-
some, but at evaluation this was not found to be a constraint. This presents an important lesson for introducing health 
management information system into drug shops. Involving stakeholders, especially the district health team, in the 
design was important for ownership and sustainability. The involvement of village health teams in community sensi-
tization to the new malaria treatment and diagnosis policy was a success and this strategy is recommended for future 
interventions.
Conclusion: Introducing RDTs into drug shops was feasible and it increased appropriate treatment of malaria with 
artemisinin-based combination therapy. It is anticipated that the lessons presented will help better implementation of 
similar interventions in the private sector.
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Background
Research has shown that formal and informal private 
sector providers are important suppliers of home-based 
treatment of illnesses [1, 2]. It has also been shown that 
in sub-Saharan Africa, 50 % of those with febrile illness 
access care through drug shops, and that 60 % of patients 
with febrile illness receive medicines from the private 
sector, including drug shops [1, 3]. Thus the private sec-
tor constitutes an important partner in the provision of 
healthcare for those with malaria in low-income coun-
tries [3–6].
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For individuals infected with malaria, a key strategy to 
avoid serious illness and death is prompt treatment with 
an effective anti-malarial drug, as the majority of malaria 
deaths occur within 24  h of the onset of disease mani-
fested by high fever [7]. In addition, current guidelines 
from World Health Organization (WHO) recommend 
that uncomplicated malaria should be treated with an 
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) and that 
all patients suspected of malaria should have a parasito-
logical test before treatment [7]. However, constraints 
to diagnosis and effective treatment, such as high costs 
in accessing health services and long distances to health 
units, have limited the implementation of the above rec-
ommendation for improving quality of care [8].
In 2010, the Affordable Medicine Facility malaria 
(AMFm), a donor subsidy at the ‘factory gate’ aiming to 
lower the cost of quality-assured ACT, was implemented. 
In addition to a price subsidy, the AMFm involved sup-
portive interventions aimed at increasing access to ACT, 
including in-country branding and awareness campaigns 
for drug sellers and patients, training for ACT provid-
ers and greater access to malaria rapid diagnostic testing 
(RDT), [9]. An evaluation of AMFm showed that an ACT 
price subsidy quickly increased ACT availability and 
market share, and lowered consumer prices [10, 11].
Overuse of ACT as a result of over-diagnosis in the 
private sector is an additional concern where subsidies 
are used to improve the affordability of quality ACT to 
patients, through mechanisms such as AMFm [12]. 
Accordingly, WHO recommends universal access to par-
asitological diagnosis, encompassing all treatment pro-
viders, including the private sector [7].
The provision of RDT in drug shops potentially raises 
a new set of issues such as: implications of adhering to 
RDT results, management of severe illnesses, referral of 
patients, and relationship with caretakers. In addition, 
drug shops are unsupervised and have social relation-
ships with the community which is substantially different 
from the interaction usually found in formal health ser-
vice [13, 14].
A study to improve diagnosis and treatment of malaria, 
as well as referrals in registered drug shops was imple-
mented in Uganda [15]. This paper presents lessons 
learned and policy implications for the benefit of policy 
makers who may be considering future large-scale imple-
mentation of malaria control in the private health sector.
Methods
Intervention
Between October 2010 and July 2012, a cluster-rand-
omized trial introducing RDT in registered drug shops 
was implemented in 59 registered drug shops in a peri-
urban area of Mukono District, Central Uganda. The 
design of the intervention was informed by formative 
research undertaken at baseline, described more fully 
elsewhere [16, 17]; the outcome of the intervention is also 
described elsewhere [15]. In brief, drug shops were ran-
domized to diagnostic methods in two trial arms: those 
trained to use clinical signs and symptoms (the presump-
tive arm), and those trained to use RDT (the intervention 
arm) to diagnose malaria. Both arms were trained to rec-
ognize signs and symptoms of malaria, clinical signs for 
referral and how to make appropriate referrals to health 
facilities. The primary outcome was the proportion of 
febrile patients receiving appropriate treatment with 
ACT.
Evaluation
An evaluation was undertaken between November 2011 
and February 2012. The details of the methods have been 
published elsewhere [8, 15, 18]. Briefly, the quantitative 
evaluation was supplemented by a qualitative evaluation 
using focus group discussions (FGDs) which explored 
the intended and unintended effects of intervention for 
patients, drug shop vendors (DSVs) and other healthcare 
providers, including referral process and lessons learned.
Ethical considerations
Ethical approval for the research was granted by review 
boards at the Uganda National Council of Science and 
Technology (Ref HS: 546) and London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine (No: 6049). Written informed 
consent was obtained from DSVs to participate in the 
trial, and from the patient (or caregiver) prior to house-
hold interviews; verbal consent was attained from 
patients attending shops. The study was registered with 
ClinicalTrials.gov on 2 September, 2010 (Trial registra-
tion: NCT01194557).
Lessons learned
Design of the intervention
In order to design the key elements of the intervention, 
a stakeholder meeting was convened to share experi-
ences with colleagues who had implemented such stud-
ies and were experienced in malaria control programmes, 
especially working with the private sector. Stakeholders 
included were Clinton Health Access Initiative, Malaria 
Consortium and The National Malaria Control Pro-
gramme at the Ministry of Health [16].
An important lesson from the stakeholders’ meet-
ing was to understand the dynamics in the drugs shops 
before implementing the intervention. Bringing together 
people with experience to help identify the key elements 
of the intervention was useful in understanding the 
dynamics. Similarly, the profit motive was identified as an 
important factor for the success of the intervention since 
Page 3 of 8Mbonye et al. Malar J  (2015) 14:448 
ACT were very expensive on the open market (approxi-
mately US$3.00) and this could not be afforded by most 
of the public. The study decided to provide free ACT 
and RDT to DSVs and to conduct a willingness-to-pay 
study (WTP) to identify recommended prices that would 
ensure that majority of the public would purchase an 
RDT and a course of ACT [19]. This approach is recom-
mended future studies.
Formative research studies were conceived to under-
stand drugs shop operations and provide a baseline. Key 
deficiencies and challenges to appropriate diagnosis and 
treatment in drug shops, such as low knowledge of cur-
rent treatment and diagnosis guideline, lack of training 
in national malaria treatment guideline, lack of reference 
materials (flow charts, job aids), limited record keeping 
in shops, and weak linkages with the public health system 
were identified during the formative research [17].
An important lesson was how to balance real-life expe-
riences of drug shop operations (baseline survey found 
out the level of training of DSVs, who actually runs the 
drug shops, opening hours, stock levels, knowledge 
on diagnosis, and malaria management) and to design 
appropriate supervision and evaluation modalities that 
would interfere minimally with DSVs’ behaviour (Haw-
thorne effect) [20], and also to reduce reporting work-
load. As part of the consenting process, DSVs were told 
that a sample of clients seen at their outlets would be 
followed up to assess their treatment-seeking behaviour 
after a visit to the drug shop, assess adherence to ACT 
treatment and the costs incurred. This was done to reas-
sure DSVs that they were not being closely monitored, 
and to reduce the risk of suspicion and breach of trust 
between the research team and DSVs. Mystery drug shop 
visits were not part of the evaluation of this interven-
tion [21]. A random sample of clients was followed up 
at home 4 and 14  days after their initial visit to a DSV. 
The key elements of the intervention are summarized in 
Fig. 1. The design of the intervention has been presented 
in detail elsewhere [16].
The involvement of the district health team and the 
community
Before implementation of the intervention, involvement 
of the district health team was considered necessary for 
three reasons: to enhance ownership and future sustain-
ability of the research project; to draw upon their experi-
ences regarding training and supervision of drug shops; 
and, to act as gate-openers to the communities. While 
designing the training curriculum and information mate-
rials, the district health educator and the District Assis-
tant Drug Inspector (DADI) were involved.
It was considered important to create community 
awareness about the study using existing community 
structures at sub-county and parish levels as the new 
malaria treatment policy (to test all fever cases before 
treatment) was not widely disseminated. The village 
health team (VHT) trainers at sub-county level were 
trained and subsequently they trained VHTs in the study 
communities. The communities were sensitized to the 
current policy on malaria diagnosis and management 
(that not all fevers were malaria and all fevers had to be 
diagnosed by taking a blood sample to confirm malaria). 
The sensitization of communities was done through 
VHTs, local radios and churches. The lesson learned was 
that the involvement of the district in the design and 
implementation of the intervention and community sen-
sitization by VHTs was important for the success of the 
intervention; and it is recommend for future studies and 
projects.
Implementing the intervention
Drug shops were invited to participate in the training; out 
of a total of 65 registered drug shops that consented to 
participate in the study, six drug shops failed to attend 
training because they thought the intervention would not 
work and that it would impact on their businesses by los-
ing profits.
Close support supervision after training was neces-
sary to ensure the drug shops mastered the new skills. 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) and job aids were 
designed and distributed to help them ensure a high 
quality of the intervention. It was decided that the first 
3  months would suffice for this purpose. An important 
lesson was that a lot of new skills and practices were 
required by DSVs that were different from their usual 
practice. For example, explaining to the clients about 
the study and their rights as research participants was a 
new practice and this posed challenges. A clinical audit 
discovered that a few drug shops were not following 
the guidelines, especially explaining patient rights. To 
address this, all the DSVs were retrained on patient rights 
and agreed to hold quarterly meetings with all DSVS to 
share experiences and learn from each other how to solve 
emerging problems. A number of DSVs were identified in 
each cluster to help in collecting forms and help supply 
of ACT and RDTs. Telephone contacts were established 
between the Principal Investigator, the field supervisor 
and DSVs to help whenever any drug shops experienced 
stock-outs. The details on how the intervention was 
implemented have been presented in detail elsewhere 
[16].
Data collection from DSVs was anticipated to be a chal-
lenge in two aspects: to get accurate data from DSVs, 
as record keeping was not usual practice in these out-
lets; to assess this aspect, ACT treatments we compared 
with records by the DSVs and the stock cards. Similarly, 
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a sample of RDTs was re-tested to assess whether the 
results matched what the DSVs had recorded. It was 
found, after they were collected and re-read by the 
research team, RDTs could be interpreted accurately by 
DSVs. The lesson learned was that it was feasible to intro-
duce routine record keeping into drug shops as part of 
the health management information system.
Evaluation of the intervention
The primary outcome results have been published else-
where [15]. In brief, the proportion of febrile patients 
who received appropriate ACT treatment was 72.9 % in 
the intervention arm versus 33.7 % in the control arm, 
an increase of 36.1  % (95  % CI 21.3–50.9), p  <  0·001. 
The majority of patients with fever in the intervention 
arm accepted to purchase an RDT (97.8  %), of whom 
58.5 % tested RDT-positive. DSVs adhered to the RDT 
results, reducing over-treatment of malaria by 72.6  % 
(95  % CI 46.7–98.4), p  <  0·001) compared to DSVs 
using presumptive diagnosis (control arm).These find-
ings present robust evidence of scaling up RDTs in the 
private sector.
A random sample of 506 patients was followed at day 
4 and 14 after the visit to the drug shop to evaluate the 
effect of the intervention on adherence to treatment, 
treatment-seeking practices after a drug shop visit, 
household costs, and referral practices. A major chal-
lenge was the time taken to follow up patients, locat-
ing their homes and the costs involved. In most cases 
researchers had to visit a home three times to get a 
response. A clinical evaluation of patient status would 
have been more informative. Patient reports of their 
health status were relied on. This has its own limitations 
because of variation in the understanding of health status 
between individuals. What is feasible on a routine basis is 
to ask patients who have not improved to come back for 
advice and possible referral.
From the inception of the study it was interesting to 
evaluate DSVs’ adherence to RDT results and how ACT 
prescriptions were recorded. There was good compari-
son between the two parameters. The DSVs’ records were 
compared with what treatment the patients in the sam-
ple were given. This yielded discrepancies in a few cases 
that were RDT-negative. This was because patients may 
not have known exactly what was prescribed. In future 
studies/interventions patients should be given a copy of 
a treatment form.
The referral practices after drug shop visits were eval-
uated and focussed on the following: what advice was 
given by DSVs, whether a referral form was provided, 
what the DSVs recorded as referral, and whether patients 
took up the referral advice. DSVs were viewed as offer-
ing a convenient and potentially cost-effective solution to 
patients where travel time and finances were important 
barriers to accessing the formal health system. The evalu-
ation showed that introduction of RDTs at drug shops 
helped to improve the desirability of DSVs in the eyes of 
their patients [8, 18].
Fig. 1 Intervention design and outcomes
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Despite the above, there was poor referral uptake. Fear 
of the implications of referral by DSVs, coupled with mis-
trust of RDT-negative results by both DSVs and patients 
led to poor referral uptake. Other constraints were the 
high costs of transport to the health facilities, and public 
health workers who were dismissive of the referral forms 
(in Luganda) coming from providers they distrusted. Fur-
ther studies are needed to assess how the barriers identi-
fied in the present study could be addressed to improve 
referral.
The policy implications
Based on a policy framework proposed by Walt and 
Gilson 1994 [22] that describes key elements (content, 
process, context, and actors) that influence policy devel-
opment and implementation, we drew the following pol-
icy recommendations (summarized in Table 1).
Content
The results of this trial showed that a package consist-
ing of training DSVs on the new treatment and diagnosis 
policy, use of RDTs, community sensitization by VHTs, 
provision of subsidized RDTs and ACT, substantially 
increased appropriate treatment of malaria with ACT, 
directing ACT to patients who were parasite-positive 
(Table  2). This package is recommended for wide-scale 
implementation in the private sector.
Process
Record keeping was found to be poor in drug shops prior 
to the intervention. Several forms were introduced for 
evaluating the intervention in addition to several pro-
cedures. This was not a constraint to drug shops. Cur-
rently the Demographic Health Information System 2 
(DHIS2) captures data from the public sector only [23]. 
Government should include the private health sector in 
the DHIS2, and this requires identifying key variables to 
be reported. This would improve coverage of data report-
ing and use of local data in planning and management 
of health services. Government would have to invest in 
this strategy. As a condition to renewal of licences, drug 
shops should sign to this reporting. Training and super-
vision should be the incentives.
Although the impact of community sensitization and 
the involvement of VHTs were not evaluated, it is believe 
community sensitization was important in increasing 
access of RDT and ACT at drug shops. Future interven-
tions could use multi-media channels (such as social 
media) to drive home messages on interventions. Mes-
sages of policy changes, such as diagnosis of fever before 
Table 1 Summary of lessons and key policy recommendations
Lessons learned Key policy recommendations
A workshop was held involving stakeholders with experience in the 
private sector to design key elements of the intervention
To scale-up RDTs and ACT requires the involvement of the districts, NMCP, 
NDA and development partners, e.g., Clinton Health Access Initiative 
(CHAI), Malaria Consortium, FIND, Uganda Health Marketing group 
(UHMG), and community-based civil society organizations
A baseline study noted poor regulation of drug shop practices NDA should recruit more personnel to register drugs shops and support 
DADI in the supervision and regulation of drug shops. More personnel 
should be recruited at district level to assist DADI in supervision of drug 
shops
A baseline study documented poor record keeping in drug shops Government to introduce DHIS2 to private health sector in order to address 
issues of data reporting coverage and to facilitate planning and manage-
ment of health services
A baseline study noted poor quality of care at drug shops Conditions should be attached to renewal of licences, mainly: minimum 
staff qualifications and evidence of continuing medical education
Drug shops were giving injections and antibiotics which are beyond their 
scope
NDA, DADI and professional associations to intensify regulation and super-
vision of drugs shops and other private health sector outlets to ensure 
patient safety
During evaluation of patient outcomes carewas taken not to influence 
DSV behaviour beyond what was realistic and sustainable
During scale-up RDTs and ACT, explaining the intervention and involving 
drug shops in the initial design processes generates acceptability and 
compliance
Community sensitization was an important factor in increasing access to 
mRDT and ACT at drug shops
Future interventions should use multi-media channels to deliver messages 
on key interventions. There is need to intensify messages on non-malaria 
fevers and care-seeking practices
There was poor referral uptake from drug shops because of mistrust 
between health facilities and drug shops
It is recommend that health workers be involved in training and supervi-
sion of the drug shops and in the design of interventions in the private 
sector
For drug shops to get involved in public health activities there have to be 
incentives
District health teams and stakeholders who involve drug shops in public 
health interventions should give DSVs certificates or trophies as signs of 
motivation
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treatment, helped to inform the community and they 
appreciated the RDTs, except in few cases where the 
negative tests were not trusted in the face of patients hav-
ing fever. There is also a need to pilot schemes that link 
communities to the health system, such as strengthened 
referral of patients.
Actors
The regulation of drug shops is a policy issue that govern-
ment should address. In this study it was found out that 
drug shops were registered by the National Drug Author-
ity (NDA) through the DADI. Some drug shops had a 
receipt indicating that they had paid the DADI and others 
had licences from the NDA. It is recommended that NDA 
recruit more personnel to register drugs shops and sup-
port the DADI in the supervision and regulation of drug 
shops. Similarly, more personnel should be recruited at 
district level to assist the DADI in regular supervision of 
drug shops. Action should be taken against drug shops 
not following regulations.
At baseline, it was found that some drug shops were 
giving injections while others stocked drugs, such as anti-
biotics which were beyond their capacity [24]. Although 
this is due to poor regulation, it has implications for 
Table 2 Summary of study outcomes
* Within 24 hours of consultation
1 ACT defined as either receiving artemether-lumefantrine of rectal artesunate
Control clusters  
(n = 10)
Intervention clusters  
(n = 9)
Clients with complete data 5797 7522
Diagnosis and treatment Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
 Blood slide-positive 1841 (31.8) 3271 (43.5)
Malaria treatment by infection status
 Blood slide-negative, received no ACT1 8 (0.2) 2662 (62.6)
 Blood slide-negative, received ACT 3948 (99.8) 1589 (37.4)
Trial endpoints Cluster mean (95 % CI) Cluster mean (95 % CI)
 Proportion of blood slide-negative patients receiving ACT 99.8 (99.5−100.0) 42.4 (28.8−56.0) p < 0.001
 Proportion of febrile patients receiving appropriate treatment  
for malaria with ACT
(95 % CI)
33.7 (25.8−41.5) 72.9 (67.3−78.6) p < 0.001
 Proportion of febrile patients seen within 24 h of onset  
of symptoms receiving appropriate treatment
26.8 (19.5−34.2) 52.8 (45.9−59.7) p < 0.001
 Proportion of febrile patients referred* 244 (3.6 %) 1019 (11.9 %) p < 0.001
Reasons for referral
 Danger signs 105 (46.9 %) 667 (78.7 %) p < 0.001
 Other signs 119 (53.1 %) 180 (21.3 %)
Recommendations from clients
What do you recommend with regard to DSV?
 Improve health facilities of DSVs 16 (19.5 %) 19 (25.3)
 Improve geographical access 2 (2.4) 3 (4.0)
 Cheaper medication 8 (9.8) 12 (16.0)
 Greater stock and variety of medication 19 (23.2) 8 (10.7)
 Show patients test results RDT/blood samples 4 (4.9) 3 (4.0)
 Continue RDT use/expand to other DSVs 26 (31.7) 10 (13.3)
 Develop RDTs for other illnesses 11 (13.4) 20 (26.7)
Which aspects of the treatment and advice you received  
at the drug shop were you happy with?
 Patient recovered/treatment worked 118 (54.4) 91 (41.5)
 Standard and form of healthcare provided 111 (51.1) 81 (37.0)
 Price of treatment and provision of credit 20 (9.2) 13 (5.9)
 Health facilities and stock of medication 9 (4.1) 2 (0.9)
 Offered referral and/or conditional advice 4 (1.8) 6 (2.7)
 Use of ‘blood test’/RDT 19 (8.8) 101 (46.1)
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patient safety [25]. It is recommended that district health 
teams and professional associations get involved in the 
regulation of drugs shops and other private health sector 
outlets to ensure patient safety.
Context
The scale-up of RDT and ACT requires government 
leadership to address issues of logistical supply of ACT 
and RDTs, price regulation and monitoring quality of 
these supplies. Under the AMFm arrangement it was 
thought that subsided ACT and RDT would be procured 
and distributed through identified pharmacies. Commu-
nities were supposed to be sensitized about prices and 
the colour label (green) of ACT. As a policy issue govern-
ment could make an application to the Global Fund and 
subsidize ACT and RDTs in the private sector to increase 
access and equity, especially in rural areas.
Referral practices were assessed; and the major issue 
was the apparent mistrust between health facility staff 
and drug shops. To address this mistrust it is recommend 
that health workers be involved in training and supervi-
sion of DSVs. This could take place at health facilities to 
initiate a process where DSVs work closely with health 
workers and gain confidence in each other. District health 
teams could initiate this interaction. Discussions on 
how to improve referral, the type of referral forms, and 
how to handle emergency cases and non-malaria fevers 
could be discussed during these interactions. A pilot 
scheme to evaluate effectiveness of different approaches 
is recommended.
There is a need to identify incentives for drug shops to 
participate in public health interventions. For example, 
in Ghana the majority of chemical sellers expected some 
form of subsidy from the government for contributing 
to public health activities, government to supply them 
with vaccines, to have tax exemptions, and to be sup-
plied with free drugs. In addition, they wanted their staff 
to be trained by the Ministry of Health, wanted scholar-
ships for further training and staff to be seconded to their 
facilities [26]. Further studies are needed in Uganda and 
elsewhere to assess how incentives could impact on drug 
shop practices.
For drug shops to get involved in public health activi-
ties there have to be incentives. Certificates provided at 
the end of training were a sign of recognition that drug 
shops had been endorsed by the Government [18]. This 
was an incentive for drug shops to participate in the 
study, complete study forms and adhere to guidelines. It 
is recommend that the district health teams involve drug 
shops and other private health sector outlets in public 
health interventions and give them certificates or tro-
phies as signs of motivation, recognition and approval.
Conclusion
Introducing RDTs into drug shops was feasible and 
it increased appropriate treatment of malaria among 
febrile patents. Successes and challenges in design-
ing, implementing and evaluating the intervention have 
been presented. Wide-scale implementation of RDTs 
in the private health sector based on these lessons is 
recommended.
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